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COMMENTS
ESCHEAT IN TEXAS:
A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTANGIBLE ISSUE
by Billy F. Hicks
The doctrine of escheat in modem American jurisidictions has evolved
from several feudal concepts which dealt separately with real and personal
property. The states, realizing the economic sensibility behind appropriation
of unclaimed property, have generally ignored historical concepts in their
efforts to adopt effective escheat procedures. As lawmakers struggle to
balance governmental budgets swelled by inflation, public policy favors a
method which allows the state to use abandoned property rather than tax
dollars drawn from a recession-angered public. 'In 1963, fifteen billion
dollars in abandoned property was estimated to exist in the United States,
increasing at the rate of an additional billion dollars per year.' The race to
appropriate this resource has led to conflicting state claims, and the establishment of constitutional guidelines.
Texas has provided for the escheat of abandoned property since 1848,2
but only since 1961 has the state required holders of abandoned property to
report the existence of such property to the state under threat of civil and
criminal liability for the failure to report.3 These escheat provisions make
Texas one of the most active states in the appropriation of abandoned
property. The Texas Supreme Court has construed the Texas escheat statutes
to allow escheat to the limits of the restrictions imposed by the due process
requirements of -the Federal Constitution. 4 The purpose of this Comment is
to determine the state of the doctrine of escheat in Texas through an
historical evaluation of the rationales of the doctrine, examination of the
Texas statute in comparison with the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act, and an analysis of past and present judicial pronouncements
regarding constitutional limitations on a state's power to escheat.
1.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ESCHEAT

An escheat in modem law
vacant by the death of owners
as a feudal term, applied only
following the death of the

is the right of the state to absorb estates left
dying without a will or lawful heirs. 5 Escheat,
to real property which passed to the overlord
owner intestate without heirs. 6 Before the

1. Lake, Escheat, Federalism and State Boundaries, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 322, 323
(1963) (citing Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22, 1962, at 1, col. 1.
2. Ch. 145, [1848] Tex. Laws, 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAs 210 (1898). Several
articles in the current Texas escheat statute have not been amended since their enactment
in 1848. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3276 (1968).
3. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.art. 3272a, § 13 (1968).

4. State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petro. Co., 510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.

1974).
5. See, e.g., 7 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY I 987-90 (rev. ed. 1974);
5 0. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 2510-16
(repl. ed. 1957).
6. Hardman, The Law of Escheat, 4 L.Q. REV. 318, 323 (1888). As the system of
tenures declined, the Crown was commonly the immediate overlord in England, and thus
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nineteenth century a felon's lands escheated to the lord and his heirs were
disinherited.7 Today, forfeitures to the state are rare and generally restricted
8
by statute.
The doctrine of escheat was founded on the system of English tenures by
which the English Crown was treated as the ultimate owner of all lands
within the realm.9 Following the American Revolution, the states were
declared the successors of the Crown for purposes of escheat.' Ownerless
personal property passed directly to the Crown under the doctrine of bona
vacantia." The various processes have merged in modern times into a
generalized concept of "escheat," although the property subject to escheat
and the circumstances giving rise to an escheat still vary greatly among the
2
states.1
The historical origins of the doctrine have rarely been considered by
Texas courts; indeed, Texas courts have strengthened the generalized concept of the doctrine by a refusal to consider historical limitations.'1 No
statutory or constitutional definitions have limited -the potential breadth of
the doctrine in Texas. The Texas Constitution merely vests the legislature
with authority to effect escheats,' 4 and statutes consistently refer to "property subject to escheat."' 5
States justify escheat on several grounds. The fundamental principle seems
to be that if the ownership of property becomes vacant, the right vests in the
it is often erroneously thought that an escheat was always to the Crown. In America,
where the system of tenures never flourished, the state as successor to the Crown almost
always stood as immediate overlord. The American states did not long depend upon their
common law heritage for a law of escheat, but began adopting statutes. The statutes were
generally applicable to real and personal property and their wording contributed to the
present connotation of the word "escheat."
For an excellent exposition of the effect of the English law of tenures in America see
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.41 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
7. 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 12 (3d ed. 1939).
8. Most state statutes prohibit the forfeiture of a felon's property to the state. 5 G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2510 (repl. ed.

1957). The Texas statute makes no provision for forfeiture for felony, but the United
States Constitution prohibits any forfeiture of property except for treason and then only
during ,the traitor's lifetime. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
A forfeiture could also arise at common law upon a death intestate when the only
heirs were not allowed to succeed to ownership. The Texas Supreme Court aptly defined
the concept: "The right to a forfeiture arises when there are heirs who can and do take,
if they fail to comply with the conditions imposed by law to enable them to obtain an
indefeasible estate." Wiederanders v. State, 64 Tex. 133, 141 (1885). Texas formerly
provided for this type of forfeiture when the only heirs were aliens, but this restriction
was repealed in 1965. Act of April 1,1921, ch. 134, [1921] Tex. Laws Regular Sess. 261
(repealed 1965). For a recent decision on the validity of such statutes under the
supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution see Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187
(1961) (treaty granting foreign nationals rights of inheritance prevails over contrary
state law).
9. 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 316 (3d ed. 1939).
10. Hughes v. State, 41 Tex. 10, 17 (1874).
11. F. ENEvER, BONA VACANTIA UNDER THE LAW OF ENGLAND 55 (1927); R.
A STUDY OF ESCHEAT AND UNCLAIMED PROPERTY STATUTES 7 (1962).
12. See text accompanying notes 85-120 infra.
13. See, e.g., State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petro. Co., 510 S.W.2d 311
(Tex. 1974); State v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 488 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth
1972, no writ); Central Power & Light Co. v. State, 410 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 933 (1967).
14. TEx. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. See also TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 20 (1869); TaX.
CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (1845); REPUBLIC OF TEx. CoNsT. § 2 (1836).
15. See, e.g., Tax. REV.CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 1 (1968).
SENTELL,
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whole community in whom it was vested at the origin of society. 16 Ration-

ales supporting this principle include the protection of the rights of owners,
prevention of corporate windfalls, and the return of funds to the stream of
commerce.17
Although historical distinctions are of dubious importance in the application of -the modern doctrine of escheat, 18 other distinctions require the
consideration of legislators and judges. Escheat statutes among the states
provide for either an absolute escheat to the state'9 or for a custodial
escheat.20 Absolute escheat statutes vest the title to the property in the
state.21 Custodial statutes provide for the state to hold the property for the

absent owners, subject to return to rightful claimants whenever they may
appear. 22 Many states have adopted a hybrid statute under which claimants
are barred from recovering the escheated property after the passage of a
period of time. 23 Thus, the hybrid statutes are absolute in nature, although
partaking of custodial attributes initially. 24 The absolute-custodial distinction
is of little consequence since the custodial property is still used by the
escheating state to produce revenue, and the holders lose the use of the

property.

25

16. Delaney v. State, 42 N.D. 630, 174 N.W. 290 (1919); cf. Robinson v. State, 87
S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, writ dism'd).
17. For an excellent discussion of -these rationales see Note, Modern Rationales of
Escheat, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (1963). See also 5 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON
THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2510 (repl. ed. 1957).
18. Since Texas and many other states have retained their common law procedure
for the escheat of decedents' estates, the distinctions may occasionally be important in
construing codified common law procedures.
19. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:37-1 to -28 (1952).
20. UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT § 19 [hereinafter cited as
UDUPA (all references are to the 1966 revisions)] (enacted by 25 states). For a
list of states which have adopted the Uniform Act and statutory citations see tables
at 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 1975 Supp. 28, 35.

21. R. SENTELL, A STUDY OF ESCHEAT AND UNCLAIMED PROPERTY STATUTES 35
(1962). The distinction between the two types of statutes is important. A custodial
escheat may be based on an administrative proceeding since no property right is being
cut off, but an absolute escheat must follow a judicial proceeding satisfying due process.
See text accompanying notes 45-55 infra. "Another distinction is that the rule of strict
construction of escheat statutes is based ,upon the fact that the true owner is permanently
deprived of his property under absolute escheat, and the rule is therefore inapplicable to
custodial statutes." Note, supra note 17, at 97 n.18, citing State v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 23 N.J. 38, 46, 127 A.2d 169, 173 (1956). This distinction is particularly valid in
Texas with a custodial statute applying to abandoned property and an absolute statute
applying to the estates of decedents. Compare TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a
(1968) with TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3273-89 (1968). The rule governing an
absolute escheat was recognized in the following: "Forfeitures not being favored. . . no
escheat .. .can be had except under and according to the legislative enactments . . .
and . . . the method provided must not be departed from in any essential particular,
otherwise the judgment will be void." Robinson v. State, 87 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1935, writ dism'd).
22. See UDUPA § 19, and text accompanying notes 86-91 infra.
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-612 (1971) (all claimants foreclosed after two years).
24. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3286 (1968) (hybrid in that claimants
foreclosed from recovery of escheated lands after four years). However, another Texas
provision regulating inactive deposits left with banking institutions is truly custodial.

Claimants whose deposits have been escheated "may at any time in the future establish
their ownership." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b § 5 (1968). The Texas scheme
of escheat exhibits the historical evolution of the doctrine with new provisions being

added as concepts changed.
25. Comment, Escheat of Intangibles: The Conflicts Problems Remain, 35 U. PITr.
L. REV. 671 (1973).
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The other major distinctions relevant to legislators enacting and judges
interpreting escheat statutes relate to the nature of the property subject to
escheat. To justify taking control of property, states have provided for a presumption of an owner's death and an apparent abandonment of property. 26
Generally, state statutes contemplate that the state shall take possession of all
property which has not been claimed for a period of years, the absence of acts
of dominion giving rise to a presumption of death. 27 The majority of the
states have also provided for the escheat of unclaimed intangibles such as unclaimed money orders, bank deposits, corporate dividends, various deposits,
and other miscellaneous debts. The burden of reporting the existence of
unclaimed property is usually placed on the holder of the property.28 Choice
of law problems have arisen in situations in which the creditor-owner of the
intangible was a citizen of a different state than the debtor-holder. 29 These
conflicts have necessitated the entrance of federal supervision and the
establishment of federal limitations on the growth of the doctrine.80
I.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS LIMITING POWER
OF THE STATES To ESCHEAT

The United States Supreme Court has said with respect to tangible
property, either real or personal, that only the state in which the property is
located may escheat.3 1 Therefore, in order to give escheat jurisdiction to the
state courts the res must have its "situs" within -the territorial limits of the
state. 8 2 Thus, an escheat of realty is always a proceeding based on jurisdiction in rem, grounded on the principle that every sovereign state has
dominion over land within its borders."" Further, tangible personal property
may also be the basis for an action in rem without offending requirements of
84
due process of law.
26. See, e.g., Astx.
3272 (1968).

STAT. ANN.

§ 50-604 (1971); TEx. Ray. Civ.

STAT. ANN.

art.

27. The Texas statute provides not only for a presumption of death, but also for the

presumption that there are no heirs. Tnx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272 and art. 3272b,
§ 7 (1968).
28. See, e.g., UDUPA § 11; HAWAII REV. STAT. § 665-16 (1968); TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 1 (1968).
29. See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965); Standard Oil Co. v. New

Jersey, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); State v. Amsted Indus., 48 N.J. 544, 226 A.2d 715 (1967);
State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petro. Co., 510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1974).
30. See text accompanying notes 71-81 infra.
31. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965).
32. Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 437 (1951).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 243 (1969);

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 254 (1934).

•

RESTATEMENT

34. Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925). Escheat of unclaimed property to
the state under appropriate statutes does not constitute a taking of property without due
process of law in violation of the Federal Constitution. Id. Nor may the validity of
escheat proceedings be challenged on the ground that they impair the validity of a
contract in violation of the Federal Constitution. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). Notice in some form is necessary to make the proceeding
in question "due process of law," but with respect to unknown claimants or owners,
service of process may be made by publication. Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256
(1896). For an excellent survey of federal requirements for sufficient notice see Overton,
A Study of Constitutional Problems and Policy Decisions in Drafting an Escheat Statute
for Tennessee, 34 TENN. L. Rv. 173, 190 (1967). See also Annot., 7 L. Ed. 2d 871, 874
(1961), supplementing Annot., 95 L. Ed. 1092 (1951).

1975]

COMMENTS

When the property subject to escheat consists of intangibles it is more
difficult to establish its situs for jurisidictional purposes. Various rules have
developed which govern the situs of intangible property. Regarding intangibles embodied in a negotiable paper, the location of the instrument determines the situs.35 The rules for determining the situs of other intangibles for
escheat purposes is not so clear. While the situs of a debt for purposes of
attachment was established in Harris v. Balk,36 the United States Supreme
Court has followed a long and winding road in establishing rules for the
determination of the situs upon which to base escheat jurisdiction. In 1965,
the Court in Texas v. New Jerseys" adopted a comprehensive rule which
covered most contingencies in the escheat of intangible property,89 and in
1972 reaffirmed that rule in Pennsylvania v. New York.4 0 However, the
Court did not specifically overrule its earlier differing decisions in the field,
and the earlier decisions have been resurrected by the Supreme Court of
Texas in a recent singular decision. 41 This necessitates a study of the judicial
developments42 which culminated in the adoption of guidelines in Texas v.
New Jersey.
An attack on the validity of the Texas escheat statute prior to the
twentieth century provided the United States Supreme Court the opportunity
to embark on a course which has since generally sanctioned the validity of
such statutes. 48 The escheat was attacked as a taking without just compensation in violation of the due process provisions of the United States Constitution. 44 The Court said that if a man died a state was under no obligation to
leave the title to his property in abeyance but through judicial proceedings
could determine who had succeeded to the estate. Due process was satisfied
if -the proceedings followed "actual notice by service of summons to all
known claimants, and constructive notice by publication to all possible
45
claimants who are unknown.
Two California cases came to the Court in 1923. In Security Savings Bank
v. California46 the Court upheld California's escheat of funds in accounts of
a California state bank. The bank contended that the statute did not provide
for the seizure of the funds essential to a valid proceeding in rem, and that
35.

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 63 (1969); RESTATEMENT OF
§ 52(a) (1934); cf. Gilmore v. Robillard, 44 F.2d 295 (9th Cir.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

CONFLICT OF LAWS

1930).
36. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The Supreme Court stated that the debt accompanied the
debtor wherever he went. Id. at 222. For an excellent summary of jurisdiction over
intangibles for purposes of taxation see Overton, supra note 34, at 176.
37. See text accompanying notes 57-81 infra.
38. 379 U.S. 674 (1965); see text accompanying notes 78-80 infra.
39. Still unsettled are questions relating to the ownership of insurance policies when
the insured and beneficiary are both unknown but were residents of different states. This
and other problems are analyzed in a recent article, Comment, Escheat of Intangibles:
The Conflicts Problems Remain, 34 U. PIrr. L. REv. 671 (1973).
40. 407 U.S. 206 (1972).
41. State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petro. Co., 510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex.
1974); see text accompanying notes 204-25 infra.
42. 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
43. Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896).
44. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
45. 161 U.S. at 275.
46. 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
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the statute's notice provisions were insufficient to bind claimants and foreclose future liability against the bank. 47 The Court declared that "[t]he
essentials of jurisdiction over the deposits are that there be seizure of the res
at the commencement of the suit; and reasonable notice and opportunity to
be heard."'48 Seizure was effected by personal service upon the bank, and
the Court stated, "There is no constitutional objection to considering the
proceeding as in personam, so far as concerns the bank; as quasi in rem, so
far as concerns the depositors; and as strictly in rem, so far as concerns
other claimants. '49 The door was thus opened to potential conflict with the
determination that a state could escheat without having jurisdiction over both
the creditor and the debtor.
5 ° the
In -the other California case, First National Bank v. California,
Court held that funds deposited in national banks were not subject to the
California escheat statute because such statutes would interfere with the
national banking system and "qualify in an unusual way agreements between
national banks and their customers." 51 The First National Bank rule was
substantially undermined twenty years later by Anderson National Bank v.
Luckett.5 2 The Court in Anderson, in upholding the validity of the Kentucky
abandoned property act, distinguished First National Bank since the statute
in that case provided for an absolute escheat without a judicial determination
of abandonment in fact. The Kentucky statute in Anderson, on the other
hand, provided for custodial escheat of the funds after a period in which no
acts of ownership were exercised with respect to the deposits and notice had
been posted publicly. The funds remained subject to the demands of
claimants. Absolute escheat followed only after a judicial proceeding determining abandonment which adequately protected the national bank from
any potential double liability. 53 In effect, Anderson National Bank removed
practically all restrictions on the state's power over abandoned bank deposits
since statutes could easily be amended to provide the necessary protection
for the bank from double liability. 54 In addition to its importance in allowing
the escheat of national bank deposits, Anderson National Bank established
the broad principle that state provisions for the custodial escheat of property
without judicial proceedings are constitutional. 5 Thus, statutes in more than
47. Id. at 286.
48. Id. at 287.
49. Id.

50. 262 U.S. 366 (1923).
51. Id. at 370.

52. 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
53. Id. at 247.
54. The Anderson National Bank decision has been criticized because of the Court's
utilization of the absolute-custodial distinction when that distinction was never mentioned in First National Bank, and the failure to consider the "interference theory"
which had served as the basis for the decision in First National Bank. R. SENTELL, A
STUDY OF ESCHEAT AND UNCLAIMED PROPERTY STATUTES

114 (1962).

55. 321 U.S. at 247. This principle as it applies to national banks has since
received a broad construction. The Court has construed Anderson as holding "in
substance . . . that the Constitution of the United States does not prohibit a State from
escheating deposits in a national bank located and actively doing business therein,
abandoned by their owners or belonging to mising persons." Roth v. Delano, 338 U.S.
226, 230 (1949).
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half the states today provide for an administrative custodial escheat of
intangible property after legislative requirements for presumptions of abandonment are met.56
As states became more active in appropriating abandoned property, the
Court was faced with the problem of which state should be allowed to
escheat an asset when more than one state was a potential escheator. In
1948, the Court in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore"7
allowed New York to escheat unclaimed proceeds of insurance policies
issued for delivery in New York to residents of New York by a Connecticut
company. While the Court refused to consider the effect of claims by other
states,58 the first sign of reasoning which would later be deemed controlling
appeared with the statement: "It is the beneficiary of the policy, not the
insurer, who has abandoned the moneys."5 9
Three years later the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey60 returned
to the reasoning of Security Savings."1 Standard Oil, a corporation, was
domiciled in New Jersey, and this fact was held sufficient grounds for New
Jersey's seizure of the debts and demands due to the corporation's creditors. 62 Personal service was had on the corporation's agent.6 3 The fact that
the New Jersey statute provided for an immediate absolute rather than a
custodial escheat was held insignificant, and jurisdiction over the absent
owners was held valid since service by publication satisified notice requirements for bringing the owners' rights within the reach of the court. 64 The
Court summarily dismissed Standard Oil's contention that the New Jersey
escheat statute offered it no protection beyond the state against actions by
other states for the same debts or demands. The Court reasoned that the
full faith and credit clause barred any such double escheat. 5 The four
dissenters argued that the claims of other states should not be foreclosed. 66
Justice Douglas, dissenting, suggested that the only appropriate tribunal for
the resolution of the conflict was the Supreme Court. 67 Justice Frankfurter
also questioned the majority's utilization of the full faith and credit clause
by stating: "The Constitution ought not to be placed in an unseemly light by
56. See, e.g., UDUPA § 13; TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 4 (1968).
The Uniform Act has been adopted in 25 states. See note 20 supra.
57. 333 U.S. 541 (1948).
58. Id. at 548.
59. Id. at 551. Two dissenting opinions were written. Mr. Justice Jackson with the
concurrence of Mr. Justice Douglas accurately predicted that "while we may evade it for
a time, the competition and conflict between states for 'escheats' will force us to some
lawyerlike definition of state power over this subject." Id. at 563 (Jackson, J.,dissenting). As pointed out in note 100 infra, the question of escheat jurisdiction over
insurance proceeds is not yet settled.
60. 341 U.S. 428 (1951); see Annot., 95 L.Ed. 1092 (1951).
61. Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); see note 46 supra and
accompanying text.
62. 341 U.S. at 438.
63. Id. at 440.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 443, construing U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each state to . . .judicial proceedings of every other State.").
66. 341 U.S. at 443, 445.
67. Id. at 445 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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suggesting that the constitutional rights of the several States depend on, and
are terminated by, a race of diligence." 68
A decade passed before the Court again faced potential conflicting claims
by different states to escheat property. In 1961, in Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Pennsylvania,69 the Court faced a situation in which Pennsylvania
had attempted to escheat all unclaimed money orders which had been
purchased in Pennsylvania on the basis that the situs of the debt was in
Pennsylvania. New York, the state of corporate domicile, had already
escheated some of the same funds. The Court distinguished Standard Oil
since in that case the claim of only one state had been before it."0 The
Pennsylvania judgment was reversed because it would not protect the
corporation in subsequent proceedings brought by other states with jurisdiction over it. The Court declined to answer "questions presented when many
different States claim power to escheat intangibles involved in transactions
taking place in part in many States,"' 1 but suggested that controversies
between states over escheat of intangibles should in the future be brought
72
before the Court under its original jurisdiction.
Texas accepted the Court's invitation to utilize its original jurisdiction, and
the long-awaited solution was presented without dissent in Texas v. New
Jersey.73 Texas brought suit against New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Sun
Oil Company to determine who was entitled to escheat small debts totaling
$26,000 which Sun Oil had owed to stockholders and employees for periods
of seven to forty years prior to the action. Florida was allowed to intervene
in the suit, claiming the right to escheat the debts owing to persons whose last
known addresses were in Florida.7 4 Texas based its claim on a contacts
theory. The debt was recorded on books kept by Sun Oil in Texas and the
contacts with that state were the most significant. 75 New Jersey claimed the

funds as the domicile of the debtor, relying on Security Savings and Standard
68. Id. at 444 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
69. 368 U.S. 71 (1961). The case was noted in numerous journals. See, e.g., Note,
Escheat-Possible Multiple Liability of Abandoned Intangible Personal Property, 11
DE PAUL L. REV. 337 (1962); Note, Conflicting State Claims Under Modern Escheat
Statutes, 16 Sw. L.J. 660 (1962); Note, Conflict of Laws-Judgment Escheating
Abandoned Intangibles Not Entitled to Full Faith and Credit, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV.478
(1962); Note, Conflict of Laws-Escheat--Cases of Multiple Escheat Are Subject to
the Original Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 39 U. DET. L.J. 431 (1962).
70. 368 U.S. at 76.
71. Id. at 80.
72. Id. at 79-80.
73. 379 U.S. 674, final decree entered, 380 U.S. 518, motion for clarification and
modification of opinion denied, 381 U.S. 931, motion for modification of final decree
denied, 381 U.S. 948 (1965); see Note, Escheat of Intangible Property and Competing
State Claims, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1101 (1965).
74. Texas v. New Jersey, motion for leave to intervene granted, 373 U.S. 948

(1963). Illinois' motion for leave to intervene was denied, 372 U.S. 973 (1963). Illinois
claimed the right to escheat the portion of the debts incurred in Illinois. The Court did
note this contention, but refused to adopt a rule so susceptible to problems of proof. 379
U.S. at 680.

75. 379 U.S. at 679. Texas also contended that the intangible obligations should be
escheatable only by it since they were derived from land located in Texas. The Court,
nevertheless, held that the fact that an intangible was income from real property was not
"significant enough to justify treating it as an exception" to general rules governing the

escheat of intangibles. 379 U.S. at 679 n.9.

1975]

COMMENTS

Oil which had allowed the state of incorporation to escheat. 76 Pennsylvania
sought to escheat the debts because the corporation's principal offices were
77
located there.
The rule proposed by Florida prevailed. The Court held the debt to be an
asset of the creditor and stated that fairness among the states required that
the right to escheat the debt should be accorded to the state of the creditor's
last known address. 78 The Court clothed the newly adopted rule in the
armour of policy by stating: "The rule . . . will tend to distribute escheats
among the states in the proportion of the commercial activities of their
residents. And by using a standard of last known address, rather than
technical legal concepts of residence and domicile, administration and appli'79
cation of escheat laws should be simplified.
The Court provided for two further contingencies. The state of incorporation would be permitted to escheat if the creditor had no last known address,
subject to the right of another state to claim the property upon proof that the
creditor's last known address was within its borders.80 If the state of the last
known address did not provide for escheat of the property, the state of
incorporation could escheat the property subject to the right of the state of
the last known address to claim the property if and when it provided for
escheat. 81
2
The Court stressed that the solution, which it has recently reaffirmed,
was not controlled by statutory or constitutional provisions, by precedent, or
even by logic. Administration and equity prompted the rule which was
"fairest, . . . easy to apply, and in the long run . . . the most generally
88
acceptable to all the states."
Before consideration of the reaction of the Texas courts to the federal
judicial requirements, an overview of the statutes governing escheat is
necessary through an examination of the Uniform Disposition of 'Unclaimed
Property Act, adopted in twenty-five states, and the Texas escheat statutes.8 4
76. Id. at 680.
77. Id.

78. 379 U.S. at 680-81.

79. Id. at 681.
80. Id. at 682.
81. Id.
82. Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972). The Pennsylvania escheat
statute indulged the presumption that the state in which a money order or traveler's
check was issued was the state of the last known address of the owner. Pennsylvania, in
an action reminiscent of the Western Union case decided a decade before, was still
attempting to escheat unclaimed funds paid in Pennsylvania to the Western Union
Telegraph Co., a New York corporation. Since money order records do not generally list
an address for either the sender or payee, most of the funds would escheat to New York
under the Texas rule. The Court, in a suit brought under its original jurisdiction, upheld
a strict application of the Texas rule, noting that the states could require records to
prevent New York's gaining all future funds. Id. at 215.
This decision has been criticized both for its mechanistic application of the Texas rule
and the failure to determine whether the sender or the recipient is the "creditor" for
purposes of escheat in money order transactions. Comment, Escheat of Intangibles: The
Conflicts Problems Remain, 34 U. P=Tr. L. REV. 671, 682 (1973).
83. 379 U.S. at 683.
84. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08 (Supp. 1974); Tnx. REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN. arts.
3272a, 3272b (1968).
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ABANDONED PROPERTY STATUTES

All states provide a procedure for the escheat of property, both real and
personal, upon the death of an intestate owner without heirs. s5 Since the
promulgation of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act in
1954, the great majority of the states have adopted more comprehensive
legislation, providing for the escheat of intangible property. s6 Under the old
statutes most abandoned intangible property never came to the state's
attention, and when it did, the state was put to the onerous task of proving
death or absence for a sufficient number of years to raise a presumption of
death.8 7 Now, statutes generally require holders of intangible property to
report the existence of the assets after a period in which no acts of ownership
are exercised over the property and the owner is unknown, greatly lessening
the states' problems of discovery and proof.88 Forty-four states appear to
have general statutes dealing with unclaimed or abandoned intangible
property.89 Of these forty-four, twenty-five have adopted the Uniform
Act, 90 and several other states have adopted statutes closely akin to the
Uniform Act. 9 1 Texas is not among the states enacting the Uniform Act, but
its statute partakes of many advantages first conceived by the national
commissioners.
A.

The Uniform Dispositionof Unclaimed PropertyAct

The Uniform Act, originally approved in 1954, was revised in 1966.
Minor revisions were made in only four sections, and do not justify a
distinction for purposes of this overview. 92 The Uniform Act is purely
85. Garrison, Escheats, Abandoned Property Acts, and Their Revenue Aspects, 35
KY. L.J. 302, 304 (1947).
86. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 79 (1961). The Court
referred to the "rapidly multiplying state escheat laws" which had originally applied only
to tangible property.
87. Braswell, Texas' New Abandoned Property Statutes, 25 TEx. B.J. 767 (1962).
88. Id.
89. Comment, Escheat of Intangibles: The Conflicts Problems Remain, 34 U. PITT.
L. REV. 671, 678 (1973). The author listed the states without general statutes as Alaska,
Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota and
Tennessee. Id. at n.9. However, Louisiana and South Dakota have since adopted the
Uniform Act. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:151-82 (Supp. 1974); S.D. CODE §§ 43-41A-1 to -52
(1973). Alaska's statute seems general in providing for escheat of intangibles. ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.50.070-.160 (1973). Holders of unclaimed personalty are required to report
it to the state after a period of dormancy. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.140 (1973). Thus 44
states, rather than the 41 reported in the 1973 article, now provide for escheat of
intangibles. Tennessee could arguably be included among these states as its statute
purports to apply to estates, real and personal, but establishes no reporting procedures.
TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 31-801 to -829 (1956).

90. For a list of states which have adopted the Uniform Act and statutory citations

see tables at 8 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 1975 Supp. 28, 35.
91. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §§ 393.010-.990 (1972); PA.

STAT. ANN. tit. 27A, §§ 1
-30 (1974). California enacted the Uniform Act in 1959, but in 1968 revised the law so
that it no longer substantially represents the Uniform Act. California Unclaimed
Property Law, CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 1500-82 (West 1972).
92. The Act was revised because of special problems concerning money orders and
traveler's checks. In § 2, 15 years was set as the period necessary for raising a
presumption of abandonment for traveler's checks instead of the seven-year period for
other property. Requirements of reporting the name and address of owners of money
orders and traveler's checks in § 11 were eliminated. Section 12 was amended to eliminate traveler's checks and money orders from the requirement of publication of a list, and
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custodial in nature and extends only to intangible personal property. The
93
common law tradition adequately provided for the escheat of tangibles.
Accordingly, under the Uniform Act, the state takes custody of the property
and retains it subject to the owner's demand for return at any time in the
future.94 The holder merely transfers the assets to the particular state agent,
after notice and administrative procedures have been complied with. The
holder is then relieved of all claims to the property paid over to the state,
and the owner is granted direct recourse against the state. 95
The Uniform Act consists of thirty-two sections arranged in four general
areas. The first area commences with a series of definitions.9 6 The second
area defines and describes the circumstances under which various classes of
property are to be presumed abandoned.9 7 The Act provides for a presumption of abandonment of property held or owing by banks or other financial
organizations, insurance companies, public utilities, business associations,
fiduciaries, and state and public agencies, if it has been held for seven years
without being claimed. 98 Section nine is an omnibus section covering all
intangible personal property, not otherwise covered, that is held in the
ordinary course of the holder's business and has remained unclaimed for
more- than seven years after it became payable. The section's devious
breadth is appreciated when one studies the opening definitions and discovers that the holder may be an individual, public corporation, "or any other
legal or commercial entity." 99
The third general area of the Act is embodied in section ten, the
reciprocity provision, an early solution to the double escheat problem. The
section provides that property owed to an owner whose last known address is
in another state by a holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of that state is
not presumed abandoned in the enacting state, if the other state provides for
escheat and grants similar reciprocity. Section ten does not apply to property
held by insurance companies, public utilities and by state courts and public
officials. 100 The Supreme Court's mandate in Texas v. New Jersey seems to
payment under § 13 was made dependent on the filing of a report of the property rather
than publication. Additionally, the definition of persons covered by the Act was
expanded by including the phrase "a business association" in § 2.
93. The Uniform Act does provide for escheat of tangible property in two situations: abandoned bank deposit box contents and a rare occurrence of corporate liquidations in kind. UDUPA §§ 2, 5.
94. UDUPA § 19.
95. Id. § 14.
96. Id. § 1.
97. Id. §§ 2-9.
98. Id. §§ 2-8. Section two is an exception to the seven-year period in that traveler's
checks are not presumed abandoned until 15 years after issuance. Several states have
enacted different periods of time in establishing a presumption of abandonment. Minne-

sota, for example, substitutes 20 years for seven years in its enactment.
345.32, .33, .35, .37 (1972).

MINN. STAT.

§§

99. UDUPA § 1(g).
100. The Commissioners justify the retention of this property "for the reason that in
each of these instances practical considerations have resulted in limiting the jurisdiction
in such manner as to preclude the possibility of multiple state jurisdiction." UDUPA §
10, Commissioners' Note. Whether the nature of this property can justify an exception to
the Texas rule is questionable in light of the recent decision in Pennsylvania v. New

York. See note 82 supra. The Uniform Act's provisions for insurance proceeds are

generally consistent with the Texas rule. Under the Uniform Act proceeds always go to

the beneficiary's last known address. The Act differs from Texas v. New lersey only
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destroy the efficacy of section ten as it relates to states without reciprocal
provisions. Under Texas v. New Jersey, if the reciprocity provision was not
met, the state of the owner's address would be the only state allowed to
escheat if it had an applicable escheat law. 1°1 If reciprocity exists, section
ten forbids the escheat of funds held by a business association which is
outside the enacting state's jurisdiction. Thus, the state of corporate domicile
may escheat the funds consistently with Texas v. New Jersey since no other
state has an applicable law when the funds are owed to a citizen of a state
without jurisdiction over the holder. The end result of a state's refusal to
grant reciprocity will often be to prevent any state from utilizing the funds
since the state of the owner's address may not have jurisdiction over the
holder to require the reporting of the existence of the funds, even though
equipped with an applicable escheat statute. Section ten can still be efficient
in insuring the reporting of all abandoned properties and their escheat among
states which have enacted it. Continued employment of its approach among
those states would not result in a double escheat or court struggle. In
demonstrating the limitations on section ten's effectiveness, one author has
already noted that none of the states with liberal corporation laws have
12
reciprocity provisions in their comprehensive escheat statutes.
The fourth and last area of the Uniform Act encompasses a broad field of
provisions treating the procedures of administration. 0 8 These sections require the reporting of unclaimed property,' 04 the publication of notice to
owners,' 0 5 payment into the custody of the state, 00 and provide methods
for claimants to recover their property' 07 from a special trust fund.'0 8 The
Act also provides that the running of a statute of limitations in regard to
property is not to bar the presumption of abandonment of the property nor
the right of the state to the property. 09 Final sections give the treasurer
power to bring action against holders refusing to deliver abandoned property
when the beneficiary is unknown. In such a case the last address of the person entitled to
the funds is presumed to be the same as the insured's last address. Texas would require
that the funds go to the state of corporate domicile. For a discussion of the identical
Texas provisions see the text accompanying notes 163-84 infra.
101. See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
102. Comment, supra note 89, at 679 (1973), citing at n.42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1197 (Supp. 1972); NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.292 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 673.339
(1969); NEV. REv. STAT. § 704.550 (1971); N.J. RV. STAT. § 2A:37-11 (1952).
103. UDUPA §§ 11-32.
104. Id. § 11.
105. Id. § 12.
106. Id. § 13.
107. Id. §§ 19-21.
108. Id. § 18.
109. Id. § 16. Texas courts have held that the statute of limitations will bar the state's
right to escheat property held contractually, but not in a fiduciary relationship, on the
principle that the state's right is derivative and can be no greater than the owner's. Shell
Oil Co. v. State, 442 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ refd
n.r.e.); Central Power & Light Co. v. State, 410 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 933 (1969). The court in Central
Power & Light discussed the legislative history of the Texas abandoned property statute
and the failure of an amendment that would have prohibited the running of the statute of
limitations against the state. 410 S.W.2d at 25-26. The case concerned the question of
whether utility deposits were debts or pledges. The court held the deposits to be debts
and thus subject to the statute. The case was noted in Note, Security Deposits with
Utilities-Debts or Pledges?, 21 Sw. L.J. 857 (1967). See text accompanying notes
193-96 inlra.
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and set forth penalties against persons wilfully failing to report or deliver
abandoned property under the Act. 110
B.

The Texas Escheat Statutes

Historical Development. The State of Texas has provided for the escheat of
both real and personal property since the nineteenth century in a fairly
modem statutory scheme. A presumption of death intestate without heirs
arises when an estate remains vacant with no lawful acts of ownership
exercised over it for a period of seven years if no will has been recorded in
the county where the property is located during that period."' This scheme
tended to focus attention on the estates of decedents since the state had no
procedure requiring reports from holders of personal property which had
become subject to escheat. When the state did locate personalty subject to
escheat, it had the additional burden, in the absence of direct proof of death,
of proving a seven-year absence. The state legislature acted in the early
1960's to remedy the situation, adopting several procedures utilized in the
Uniform Act. 1 2 This legislative reform took the form of supplements to the
old scheme of escheat."13 The old provisions were retained for the escheat of
real property and the estates of decedents. They provide for an absolute
escheat to the state after notice and a judicial proceeding determining that
the estate has escheated. 1 4 Three new statutes were enacted governing
personal property. Article 3272a establishes a broad scheme for the custodial
escheat of personal property held by any entity other than a banking
institution or life insurance company. 15 Article 3272b deals with funds held
by banking institutions." 8 Article 4.08 of the Insurance Code deals with
funds held by life insurance companies.'"7
The new statutes retain the presumptions of the old scheme, but otherwise
differ from traditional escheat statutes. Under the new articles, the owner
retains title to the property; the state acts merely as conservator pending the
Kentucky has provided by statute that the statute of

-limitations may serve as a

defense. KY. REV. STAT. § 393.110 (1972). Oklahoma appears to have a constitutional
prohibition against reviving a cause of action barred by the statute of limitations. Mires
v. Hogan, 79 Okla. 233, 192 P. 811 (1920).
110. UDUPA §§ 24-25.
111. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 3272, 3273-89 (1968).
112. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08 (Supp. 1974); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts
3272a, 3272.b (1968). Basically the new articles utilize the administrative procedures
popularized by the Uniform Act. Initially, the abandoned property statute, article 3272a,
relied on judicial proceedings and provided for an absolute escheat with title vesting in
the state. The Act was amended in 1965 to provide for a custodial escheat following
administrative proceedings. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, ch. 21, § 1, [1961]
Tex. Laws 1st Called Sess. 49, as amended, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a
(1968). For an analysis of article 3272a before its 1965 revamping see Braswell, Texas'
New Abandoned Property Statutes, 35 TEx. B.J. 767 (1962).
113. "The provisions of this Article 3272a are . . . supplementary to and shall not be
construed to repeal, alter, change, or amend any of the provisions of Articles 3273 to
3289, . . . which provide for the escheat of estates of decedents." TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 3272a, § 14 (1968). See also id. art. 3272b, § 10.
114. TEx. REv.CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3273-89 (1968).
115. See text accompanying notes 123-45 infra, and note 240 infra.
116. See text accompanying notes 146-62 infra, and note 240 infra.
117. See text accompanying notes 163-84 infra, and note 240 infra.
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appearance of the owner."18 Special funds are established for the reimbursement of claimants. 119 The procedure is purely administrative since no
property rights are cut off. 120 The holder delivers the property to the state
and is relieved of any subsequent liability with respect to the property so
delivered. 12 Judicial proceedings are used only upon noncompliance with
any provisions of the statutes, and rather stringent punishment is allowed
22
against wilful noncompliance.
Unclaimed Personal Property. Article 3272a consists of sixteen sections and
establishes a comprehensive scheme for the custodial escheat of practically
all imaginable escheatable assets with the exception of bank deposits' 23 and
funds held by life insurance companies. 1 24 Holders specified as subject to
the terms of the statute include individuals, corporations, business associations, partnerships, governmental subdivisions, estates, trusts, trustees, court
officers, liquidators, and other entities. 125 Property subject to the statute's
coverage includes money, securities, dividends, accrued interest, claims for
money or indebtedness, utility and other service deposits, proceeds from
mineral estates, "and all other personal property and increments thereto,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether held within this State, or without
the State for a person or beneficiary whose last known residence was in this
State. '120 Holders of such property are required to file a report of the
property with the State Treasurer within sixty days after the property
becomes subject to escheat, and subsequently must file an annual report of
127
the property.
Sections three and four provide for the actual administration of the statute.
Names of the owners as reported by the holders are posted on the courthouse
door or bulletin board in the holder's county. If the property is worth more
than $50, notice is published in a newspaper in the county of the last known
118. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 7 (Supp. 1974); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 3272a, § 4, 3272b, § 6 (1968).
119. Tax. INs. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 9 (Supp. 1974); TEx. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN.
arts. 3272a, § 4(c), 3272b, § 4 (1968).

120. See text accompanying note 56 supra. Judicial proceedings reserved for dece-

dents' estates may be employed in some circumstances over abandoned property upon the

petition of the attorney general, or any district, criminal district, or county attorney.
"This procedure shall be supplementary to and cumulative of any actions or procedures
authorized in article 3272a with respect to escheat of personal property and either
procedure may be followed in applicable cases." TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3273

(1968).
However, the Unclaimed Funds Statute for Life Insurance Companies provides that
"[n]o other Statute of this state relating to escheat . . . shall apply to life insurance
companies ...." TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 13 (Supp.1974).
121. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 7 (Supp. 1974); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 3272a, § 4(c), 3272b, § 4 (1968).
122. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 14 (Supp. 1974); TEX. REv. CV. STAT. ANN.

arts. 3272a, § 13, 3272b, § 9 (1968).
123. TEx. REV.Cv.STAT. ANN.art. 3272a, § l(a) (1968).
124. Although not exempted by article 3272a, the unclaimed insurance funds statute,
enacted two years after article 3272a, provides that no other escheat statutes shall apply
to life
insurance companies. TEX.INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 13 (Supp. 1974).
125. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 1(a) (1968).
126. Id. § l(b).

127. Id. § 1,2.Property subject to escheat must meet article 3272's requirements of
a seven-year absence without the filing of a will in the county where the property is

situated. Id. § 1(c).
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address of any owner named in the report, and if no address is known, then
in the county of the holder's principal place of business or registered
office. 128 Notice is also mailed to the address of each owner entitled to
property worth more than $50.129 At the expiration of ninety days from the
publication of notice, or of 120 days from the filing of the report if no
publication was required, the holder pays or delivers the property to the State
Treasurer if the owner has not established his right to the property with the
holder.' 30 The holder is relieved of all liability to the extent of the value of
the property so paid or delivered and all subsequent claims must be directed
to the state. 1 3 1 The State Treasurer may sell any escheated property at
132
public sale under specified conditions.
The next sections provide for refunds, 13 3 establish an administrative
procedure for claimants, 134 and allow suit against the state in state district
courts by any claimant aggrieved by an administrative decision. 135
Section ten of the Texas statute is a reciprocity provision almost identical
to section ten of the Uniform Act. The Texas statute differs in only one
detail, but that detail is quite significant. The Uniform Act provides that
property is not deemed abandoned in the enacting state if (1) the other state
has jurisidiction over the holder, (2) the last known address of the owner
was in the other state, (3) it may be claimed under the laws of the other
state, and (4) the other state has a reciprocal provision. 136 Texas utilizes
the Uniform Act's wording exactly, except for substitution of the word
"may."' 1 7 Thus, in Texas the property is subject to escheat unless it "has"
been claimed under the laws of another state and the laws of such other state
make reciprocal provisions. Double escheats would theoretically be possible
under section ten of the Texas act. Even if another state had already
escheated property, the State of Texas would escheat if the laws of the other
state did not contain a reciprocal provision. The section does not provide the
true reciprocity of the Uniform Act, since Texas attempts to escape any
restraints and to gain all benefits. The spirit of the section is destroyed by the
Texas substitution. If the Supreme Court adheres to its rule in Texas v. New
Jersey, the force of section ten will never be felt, presuming a holder willing
and able to appeal, since the section's provisions are obviously at odds with
the guidelines established by the Court. 138 Restraint by Texas officials in
utilizing section ten may be the preventive which will leave it on the books. 39
128. Id. § 3.
129. Id. § 3(e).
130. Id. § 4.
131. Id. § 4(c), 6.
132. Id. § 5. The proceeds of the sale are held for any claimants. Purchasers receive
good title free from any claims of the owner or prior holder. The sale must be preceded
by published notice. Id. This procedure differs from the disposition of realty escheated
under article 3273 which must be held for two years before 'being sold. TEx. REv. Civ.

art. 3279 (1968).
133. Id.art. 3272a, § 6 (1968).

STAT. ANN.

134.
135.
136.
137.
(1968).
138.

Id.§ 7.
Id. § 8.
UDUPA § 10; see text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
Compare UDUPA § 10 with TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 10
See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.

139. The State Treasurer may prescribe necessary rules and regulations for the
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The statute makes an unusual anticipation in providing that in the event
the federal government enacts laws furnishing information regarding abandoned property held by it, the State Treasurer is authorized to compensate
the federal government for the costs of examining records.' 40 If the federal
government delivers such property to the state, the state will assume all
liability to the owners of such property.' 41 In deference to national interests,
the statute also provides that it does not apply to bank accounts within Texas
1 42
whose last known owner was a citizen and resident of another country.
An Escheat Expense and Reimbursement Fund is established in the
amount of $100,000 for payment of claims and expenses of administration.' 48 Funds delivered to the State Treasurer are used to maintain the fund
with any excess paid to the state's general revenue fund.144 Compliance with
the Act is prompted by authorization of penalties of not less than $500, nor
more than $1000, or not more than six months in jail or both against holders
wilfully failing to file a report or refusing to permit examination of
45
records.'
Inactive Bank Deposits. Banking institutions administer inactive accounts
under article 3272b, a statute which relies for administration on the provisions of article 3272a, but which differs conceptually both from its sister
3272a and the Uniform Act. 146 The term "depository" applies to any
"banking institution . . . which receives and holds for others deposits of
money . . . in banking practice or other personal property in this State, or in
other States for residents last known to have resided in this State."' 4 I A
dormant or inactive account is an account of indebtedness which has
remained inactive for a period of more than one year without any action
taken in regard to the account by the depositor or his agent.' 48 Dormant
accounts lose their status when a deposit or withdrawal is made from the
account by the depositor himself or through an agent, other than the
depository itself.149 Depositories are forbidden to reduce any dormant
deposit through any service charges "or any other procedure" so long as the
deposit remains in a dormant status.' 50 Costs of publishing notice are the
only charges allowed to be assessed against the deposit.' 51
administration of the statute. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 3272a, § 12, 3272b, § 8

(1968).
clauses
140.
141.
142.

He might restrict the Texas reciprocity clause to insure consistency with the
adopted by Uniform Act states. See text accompanying notes 235-38 inira.
TEx. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 11 (1968).
Id.
Id. § 10a.
143. Id. § 15.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 13. Broad inspection power is given to the State Treasurer or Texas Attorney General or their representatives at "all reasonable times" to "examine the books and
records of any person to enforce this Article . . . ." Id. § 9.
146. Amendments to sections four and five in the last legislative session have
virtually destroyed article 3272b's distinctiveness. Prior to the 1975 amendments the Act
aimed for conservation of inactive deposits by the depository. Now the state takes
custody of the funds rather than allowing them to remain under the custody of the
depository. See text accompanying notes 154-59 infra.
147. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b, § 1(a) (1968).
148. Id. § 1(b).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 2.
151. Id.
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After a deposit remains dormant continuously for seven years, the depository, not knowing the whereabouts of the depositor, is required to publish a
notice of the existence of the fund in a newspaper of the city or county in
which the depository is located. Such notice must list the names of all owners
of such deposits in alphabetical order and the last known addresses, if any, of
such persons. 15 2 This procedure must be repeated annually during the
month of May. 15 3 On or before May 1 of the year following the first
publication required by the statute, the depository must file a report with the
State Treasurer listing the names of all depositors whose names were
published whose whereabouts still remain unknown. 5 4 The amount listed in
this report is delivered to the State Treasurer, and the depository is then
relieved of liability with respect to the deposits.15 5 Before the 1975 amendment of this section the depository was required to deliver accounts in excess
of $25 only if it concluded that "further cost and effort to locate the
depositor or creditor would be unwarranted."' 56 Under the prior law the
depository had to report the existence of deposits in excess of $25 which
were advertised but not claimed.15 7 Such funds remained the responsibility
of the depository until paid to the owner, to the State Treasurer under the
statute, or escheated under judicial proceedings.' 5 8
Funds held by depositories are paid into the State Conservator Fund
which covers administrative expenses and reimbursement claims. 159 Whenever moneys in the fund exceed $250,000, they are transferred to the
Ayailable School Fund. 16 0 Claims are handled under the procedure established in article 3272a with the exception that claimants may seek reimbursement from the depository which will then be reimbursed from the
Conservator Fund. 1 6' Depositories wilfully failing to publish the list of
depositors required by the act are subject to penalties of not less than $500
1 62
or not more than six months in jail, or both.
152. Id. § 3.
153. Id.
154. Ch. 263, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 638, amending TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 3272b, § 4 (1968).
155. Id. This procedure may be contrary to the Texas rule since the last known
address of the depositor is not taken into consideration. See text accompanying note 187
infra, and notes 78-81 supra.
156. Ch.3, § 4, [1962] Tex. Laws 3rd Called Sess. 7. The depository was relieved of
liability for these larger payments also. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Note that before 1975 judicial proceedings under article 3273 were the only
method by which the state could escheat funds held by depositories which exceeded $25
if the depository did not choose to voluntarily pay the money to the state. See note 120
supra and accompanying text.
159. Ch. 263, § 2, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 639, amending TEx. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 3272b, § 5 (1968). Section five saw only two changes in the recent legislature.
The State Treasurer is now required to compile an alphabetical list of dormant account
owners which shall be available for public inspection. Formerly the Treasurer had only
to keep a record of names which was available only to those satisfying him of their
"interest or possible interest therein."
160. Id. Thus, escheated properties in Texas eventually benefit three separate funds:
lands to the permanent free school fund, id. art. 3281; bank deposits to the available
school fund, id. art. 3272b, § 5; and abandoned personal property and insurance funds to
the general revenue, TEx. INs. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 9 (Supp. 1974); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 15 (1968).
161. TEx. REv.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b, § 6 (1968).
162. Id. § 9. This section places a $1000 ceiling on liability.
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Unclaimed Life Insurance Funds. Until 1963, life insurance companies were
regulated by article 3272a. Since that time they have been required to
administer unclaimed funds under the Unclaimed Funds Statute for Life
Insurance Companies of the Texas Insurance Code' 63 which covers "unclaimed funds . . . of any life insurance company doing business in this state
where the last known address, according to the records of such company, of
the person entitled to such funds is within this state."'1 64 When there is doubt
as to the person entitled to the funds, or someone other than the insured or
annuitant is entitled to the funds and his address is unknown, the act
provides for a presumption that the last known address of the person entitled
to the funds is the same as the last known address of the insured or
annuitant. 165 This is the same rule provided in the Uniform Act' 6 6 and
hopefully will withstand any attacks grounded on the Texas v. New Jersey
16 7
rule.
Unclaimed funds are defined as funds which have remained unclaimed for
seven years or more after they became due under any life or endowment
insurance policy or annuity contract which has matured or terminated. 68
Annual reports of unclaimed funds must be made to the State Treasurer. 169
In September the treasurer is required to give notice of the unclaimed funds
of $50 or more.' 70 The notice is published in each county of the last known
address of a person entitled to funds' 7' and sets forth the names of persons
in that county to whom funds are due and information regarding the amount
due and the company.' 7 2 On or before the following December 20, all
unclaimed funds not paid to claimants are required to be paid to the State
Treasurer.173 The statute provides that companies making such payments
are relieved of all liability, 1 74 and in a series of special provisions unique to
this act establishes a mechanism to insure such relief. If a company is sued
by an individual or another state with respect to any funds paid to the State
Treasurer, the company is to notify the State Treasurer and the Attorney
75 If
General, and the Attorney General "in his discretion" may intervene.'
judgment is entered against a life insurance company for any amount paid to
the State Treasurer including any interest, the State Treasurer is directed to
immediately reimburse the company the amount paid in satisfaction of the
163. Tax. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08 (Supp. 1974). Article 3272a's application was
rescinded in a provision that no other escheat statutes should apply to life insurance
companies. Id. § 13.

164. TEx. REV.CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 13 (1968).
165. Id.
166. UDUPA § 3.
167. See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra, and note 100 supra.
168. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 4.08, § 3 (Supp. 1974). Policies not matured by proof
of death are deemed matured and the proceeds due "only if such policy is in force when
the insured shall have attained the limiting age under the mortality table on which the
reserve is based." Id.
169. Id.§ 4.
170. Id.§ 5.
171. Id.§ 5(a).
172. Id.§ 5(b).
173. Id. § 6.
174. Id. § 7.
175. Id.§ 8(b).
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judgment. 176 Expenses incurred in the legal proceedings are also to be reim7
bursed.1
A special trust fund is established 178 from which claims which may be
made at any time are paid.' 7 9 Unclaimed funds which have remained in the
trust fund for seven years or more are annually paid into the state's general
revenue fund as long as the trust fund's assets are not reduced below
$100,000.180 If the State Treasurer refuses a claim, suit may be brought
against the state in his name.' 8 Additionally, claimants may seek payment
from the insurance companies which are authorized to make payments to
persons "appearing to such company to be entitled thereto and upon proof of
such payment the State Treasurer shall forthwith reimburse such company for
such payment.' 8 2 Before entering a court of law, claimants should exhaust
both their remedies since the determinations of the State Treasurer and the
insurer are not dependent upon each other. 18 ' Penalties under the act are
the same as those for violations of articles 3272a and 3272b.18 4
Areas of Conflict. Analysis of the Texas statutes shows several potential
areas of conflict with the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Texas v.
New Jersey.18 5 After the passage of the seven-year period required to raise
the presumption of abandonment, property is subject to escheat, "whether
held within this State, or without the State for a person or beneficiary whose
last known residence was in this State."' 186 Thus, unless such property has
already been escheated under the conditions specified in section ten of article
3272a, Texas may escheat, Texas v. New Jersey to the contrary notwithstanding. The Texas provisions for the escheat of bank deposits also fail to
conform to the Texas v. New Jersey rule since the holder-depository's and
not the creditor's domicile is determinative for escheat purposes. However,
these provisions will probably not soon be attacked since other states can
187
utilize the Texas procedure to claim the funds rather easily.
The United States Supreme Court in Texas v. New Jersey attempted to
resolve conflicting state claims to property subject to escheat. Henceforth, the
state of the creditor's last known address shown on the corporate books
would be the only state allowed to escheat. s8s If there was no last known
address or the state of the last known address did not provide for escheat of
176.

Id.

177. Id.
178. Id. § 9.
179. Id. § 10.
180. Id. § 9. The State Treasurer may pay a claim out of the general revenue fund if
the special trust fund is insufficient. Id. § 11.
181. Id. § 10.
182. Id. § 8(a).

183. The State Treasurer has no discretion. If an insurance company pays a claimant,
it merely produces proof of the payment for reimbursement. Id.
184. Id. § 14 (not less than $500, nor more than $1000, or not more than six months
in jail or both). See also text accompanying notes 145 and 162 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 78-81 supra.
186. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 1(b) (1968) (not applicable to banking

institutions and life insurance companies).
187. Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272b. See text accompanying notes 146-62
supra.

188. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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the property, the state of corporate domicile could escheat subject to the right
of the state of the last known address to recover if it could prove such
address or if it subsequently enacted an applicable escheat law.' 8 9 Presumably unincorporated and individual debtors would be subject to the same rule.
Administration of escheat statutes under the Texas rule leaves a troublesome gray area in which much property remains unreported and unclaimed. 190 This is that class of property held by debtors neither domiciled
in nor doing business in the state of the last known address of the owner.
Texas and other states require the reporting of such property, but enforcement against foreign holders is not easily effected.' 9' This problem was
recognized and confronted by the Supreme Court of Texas in a recent case,
State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co., 19 2 allowing custodial escheat of assets due to creditors whose last known addresses were not in
Texas, without regard to the existence of applicable escheat laws in other
states. Such other states upon learning of the assets could utilize the simple
Texas procedure to assert any superior rights they might have. The result
seems equitable, but the decision merits further consideration. Historically,
federal rules regarding escheat have changed each decade. Perhaps the
rumblings of change will once more be prompted by Texas greed.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON ESCHEAT IN TEXAS

Before succeeding in the Texas Supreme Court in 1974, the Texas
Attorney General had twice before contended in Texas appellate courts that
the state should be allowed to "take custody" of funds owed to creditors
whose last known addresses were in other states having applicable escheat
laws. In the first of those cases, Central Power and Light Co. v. State,193 the
state attempted to escheat $462 in unclaimed dividends owing to persons
with last known addresses in nine other states having applicable escheat
laws.' 94 The court of civil appeals cited only the Texas v. New Jersey
decision of the previous year in reversing the trial court's decree of escheat. 195 The court stated that the question had been "authoritatively
settled" and Texas was not entitled to escheat the property.' 9 6
A different court of civil appeals was faced with the Texas rule in 1972 in
State v. Texas Electric Service Co.,' 97 an action by an electric company to
recover funds paid to the state under article 3272a. Over $90,000 in debts
upon which the statute of limitations had run had been paid to the state.
189. 379 U.S. at 682.
190. See generally Comment, Escheat of Intangibles: The Conflicts Problems Remain,
34 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 684-85 (1973).
191. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a (1968); see text accompanying notes 227,
229-32 infra.

192. 510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1974).
193. 410 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied 389 U.S. 933 (1967). See also note 109 supra.
194. The state also attempted to escheat unclaimed wages and customer's service
utility deposits totaling several thousand dollars. That attempt failed, but on other
grounds which are dealt with in note 109 supra.
195. 410 S.W.2d at 26.
196. Id. at 26-27.
197. 488 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1972, no writ).
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Since in Texas the state can escheat only the right which the absent owner
would have, 198 the company had paid over funds which it could have
retained. The court denied recovery since the company had waived its right
to plead any defense. 199 The company had also paid $1,323 in stock
dividends to the state which were owing to persons whose last known
addresses were in other states. The company asserted that Texas v. New
Jersey precluded the state's retention of the dividends.200 The court refuted
this contention with a dubious construction of the Texas rule.
According to the language of the [C]ourt in Texas v. New Jersey, if the
appellee desired to defeat the right of the State of Texas to escheat the
dividends in question, it was incumbent upon appellee to produce proof
that the laws of the states of last known 20address
of the shareholders
1
provided for the escheat of those dividends.
This construction seems inconsistent with the reasoning in Texas v. New
Jersey. Since the escheating state gains the benefit of custody of the funds, it
would seem that the state should have the burden of proving no other state's
right to them.2 0 2 Additionally, the court of civil appeals ignored the rule of
evidence followed in Texas that "[t]he law of another state or country is
presumed to be the same as that of Texas in the absence of pleading and
proof of such law. [This presumption] extends to the statutory law of the
foreign state [as well as the common law]." ' 20 3 The state of Texas would
retain the funds. Texas v. New Jersey was not mortally wounded, but its
foundations had felt the first tremor of an attack.
The next year found the state again claiming assets held in Texas for
creditors whose last known addresses were in other states in State v.
Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petroleum Co. 20 4 The liquidating trustees
of the Republic Petroleum Company, a New Mexico corporation dissolved
under the laws of that state in 1949, held a fund of liquidating dividends in a
Dallas bank. The surviving trustees had resided in Texas for at least fifteen
years prior to the filing of suit for the custody of the funds. The trustees had
reported the existence of the funds in compliance with article 3272a, but
contended they were not subject to escheat by Texas. 20 5 The dividends were
owed to 208 stockholders, only one of whom had a last known address in
Texas. 20 6 The trial and appellate courts sustained the trustees' contentions,
allowing the state to escheat only the $114.40 owing the one stockholder
198. See note 109 supra.

199. 488 S.W.2d at 880.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 882.
Id.
See Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 681-82 (1965).
1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TExAs LAw OF EVIDENCE § 99, at 132 (2d ed.

1956); see authorities cited id., n.60.

204. 497 S.W.2d 527, 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), rev'd, 510 S.W.2d 311

(Tex. 1974).

205. If a holder refuses to deliver property to the State Treasurer which is deemed
escheated under the statute's presumptions, the Texas Attorney General is authorized to
bring suit to compel delivery of the property. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a,
§ 4(d) (1968).
206. Six stockholders had last known addresses in foreign countries; the remaining
201 stockholders had last known addresses in states other than Texas. 497 S.W.2d at 528.
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whose last known address was in Texas. The state's arguments centered
around the custodial nature of the statute, the context of previous cases, and
the Texas Electric Service Co. construction of the Texas v. New Jersey
rule. 207 The court of civil appeals looked to the Texas rule as applied in
Central Power and Light 20 8 and held that the contentions of the state had
been foreclosed by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 200
Although the trustees had not produced proof that the laws of the other
states provided for escheat, the court held that there was a presumption that
the law of "all other states in question is the same as the law in Texas," thus
defeating Texas' claims under the Texas Electric Service Co. requirement of
210
proof of applicable law in other states in order to defeat Texas' claims.
The Texas Supreme Court granted the state's writ of error and reversed
the decision of the lower court in State v. Liquidating Trustees of Republic
Petroleum Co. 2 11 The unanimous court distinguished the Western Union and
Texas cases, and returned to the reasoning of Standard Oil.21 2 Texas was
held to be "the situs of the intangible personal property" over which the
struggle for custody was taking place. 218 The trustees contended that New
Mexico laws giving corporate life until liquidation was complete, coupled
with the liberal long-arm statute of New Mexico, would subject them to in
personam jurisdiction in that state and possible multiple liability for the
funds since New Mexico's enactment of the Uniform Act allowed that state
to escheat. 214 The Texas court, nevertheless, held that Texas was the
domiciliary state of the stakeholders and that New Mexico could not claim to
be the domiciliary state of the corporation for escheat purposes. 21 5 The court
quoted article 3272a's provision relieving the holder "of all liability to the
extent of the value of the property so paid . . . for any claim which . . .

may arise or be made in respect to the property, ' 210 and then noted that
"express provisions are made for reimbursement to any person, including any
State, which comes forward with proof of a valid superior claim to any of
such funds. ' 21 7 Since the holder would be protected from multiple liability,
there was held to be no violation of due process.
207. Id. See also Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error at 3, 4, State v.
Liquidating Trustees of Republic Petro. Co., 510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1974).
208. 410 S.W.2d 18; see text accompanying notes 193-96 supra and note 109 supra.
209. 497 S.W.2d at 528, citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71
(1961), and Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
210. 497 S.W.2d at 529.
211. 510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1974). The court cited every major escheat case to have
come before the United States Supreme Court since Security Savings in 1923 with the
exception of Pennsylvania v. New York. See text accompanying notes 46-83 supra and
note 82 supra.
212. 341 U.S. 428 (1951); see text accompanying notes 60-68 supra.
213. 510 S.W.2d at 313.
214. Id. at 312-13. See also Respondent's Reply Brief at 2-3, 6, State v. Liquidating
Trustees of Republic Petro. Co., 510 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1974). The trustees in liquidation
were also directors of the New Mexico corporation. The New Mexico long-arm statute
provides for in personam jurisdiction over persons who have transacted business within
the state. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16 (1953). Thus, the trustees fears seem to have
substantial basis. New Mexico does provide for the escheat of funds held by business
associations organized under its laws in its enactment of the Uniform Act. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-22-6 (Supp. 1973).
215. 510 S.W.2d at 312.
216. Id. at 314.
217. Id.
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The Texas Supreme Court looked to the facts of both Western Union and
Texas v. New Jersey and held those cases "clearly distinguishable" since in
both cases more than one state had claimed the property and the holders
were subject to multiple jurisdiction. 218 Further, Western Union was inapplicable since the trustees had "no problem of protection against subsequent
liability to other States" because of the nature of the Texas statute. 219 The
case before the court was said to be like Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey in
which no other states were making active claims, and New Jersey was
allowed to escheat dividends owed to persons with last known addresses
outside of New Jersey. 220 The court stressed that Western Union had not
overruled Standard Oil, but. the results merely differed because of the
"distinguishing fact that the claim of no other state to the property was
'22
before the Court." 1
Texas v. New Jersey was held to be "likewise distinguishable. ' 22 2 Not
only did it involve an actual controversy between states, but it had received
an erroneous interpretation by the lower Texas courts. If the interpretation
of the lower courts that a mere showing of an applicable escheat statute of a
state of a creditor's last known address could defeat an action by Texas even
though the other state had not come forward was followed, "stakeholders
[could] hold, and in many cases dissipate, the property even though no
other State ever [claimed it]." '22 ' The Central Power and Light and Texas
22 4
Electric Service Co. decisions were overruled.
The Texas court quoted extensively from Texas v. New Jersey before
formulating its own rule.
In view of the last sentence of the Supreme Court's opinion [in Texas v.
New Jersey] .. . , we interpret that decision to mean that in a suit

strictly between the domiciliary State and a resident stakeholder, the
State is entitled to a judgment against the stakeholder for custody of the
property, subject to some other State coming forward at a subsequent
time with proof that it has a superior right to escheat or custody.2 25
The "last sentence" relied upon for their interpretation seems hardly capable
of justifying such a construction unless taken completely out of context. It
follows:
In other words, in both situations [state of last known address has no
applicable escheat law, or no last known address exists] the State of
corporate domicile should be allowed to cut off the claims of private persons only, retaining the property for itself only until some other State
comes forward with proof that it has a superior right to escheat. 220
218. 510 S.W.2d at 313. Texas was held to be the only state with jurisdiction over the
holders, disregarding New Mexico's long-arm statute. Id.; see note 214 supra.

219. 510 S.W.2d at 313.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 314.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 682 (1965).
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The court concluded with the observation that its interpretation was "the
only interpretation which would permit the purpose of State escheat and
custodial laws to be effective as to abandoned properties within the jurisidiction of one State but owed to disappeared persons with last known addresses
in States which have no jurisdiction to require reporting or delivery of the
property."' 22 7 Other states would be able to learn "of the funds and assert
administratively and in our courts any superior rights which they may
228
claim.,
Superficially this new development seems consistent with the "ease of
administration" envisaged by the United States Supreme Court when it first
announced the Texas v. New Jersey rule. If Texas will afford other states a
simple and fair administrative procedure for assets due them under the
Texas rule, the new position adopted in Republic Petroleum will warrant
little criticism, even for its devious birth.
In State v. Amsted Industries229 the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reached a contrary conclusion to Republic Petroleum in a factually similar
case. The state contended that it could custodially escheat unclaimed dividends held by a corporation for persons whose last known addresses were in
states with applicable escheat laws but which possessed no jurisdiction over
the holding corporation. The New Jersey court examined Texas v. New
Jersey and concluded that "nothing . . . in Texas [v. New Jersey] . . .

lends any support to New Jersey's contention that creditor's state supplants
the state of incorporation only if [the corporation is subject to the jurisdiction of the creditor's state].' '230 The unanimous court interpreted Texas
v. New Jersey as granting "the creditor's state . . . the paramount in-

terest and other states should do what they can to honor it."' 23 ' Expanding
concepts of jurisdictional power might provide jurisdiction for the creditor's
states, and if not, the court noted that New Jersey's courts were open to other
82
states for escheat actions .
In closing, it may be noted that the solution adopted by the Texas
Supreme Court in Republic Petroleum is not the only answer to effective
escheat of property held outside the jurisdiction of the state with the
"superior" right under the Texas rule. Some writers have suggested adoption
of a special jurisdictional rule for escheat proceedings, allowing any state
entitled to escheat to do so in its own state. 28 8 New Hampshire has adopted
a potential solution in providing that its attorney general, at the request of
another state, may bring an action in New Hampshire to enforce the
227. 510 S.W.2d at 315.
228. Id.
229. 48 N.J. 544, 226 A.2d 715 (1967).

230. Id. at 717-18.
231. Id. at 718.
232. Id.

233. See Comment, A State Statute for the Disposition of Unclaimed Property, 3
135, 186 (1965); Note, Escheat of Corporate Intangibles, 41 NoTRE
559, 569 (1966); Note, Unclaimed Debts Owed by Corporation Held
Escheatable by State of Creditor's Last Known Address, 9 UTAH L REv. 1045, 1048
HARV. J. LEos.
DAME LAWYER

(1965).
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abandoned property laws of the other state if the other state makes
reciprocal provisions. 234 So far, New Hampshire stands alone.
The Uniform Act also has succeeded in providing for escheat of all
unclaimed dividends and distributions. 23 5 The Uniform Act allows escheat
of dividends and distributions only if they are held by a business association
incorporated in that state or by a business association doing business in that
state whose records show the last known address of the claimant to be in that
state. The Act does not provide for escheat of funds held by a corporation
neither domiciled in nor doing business in the state, regardless of the last
known address of the creditor. 23 6 Thus, under Texas v. New Jersey, the
state with jurisdiction over the holder in the absence of an applicable law in
2 7
the state of the last known address may escheat.
Probably the Texas courts never realized how very near a solution they
23
If
were with the almost perfect wording of the Texas reciprocity clause.
the Texas Supreme Court in Republic Petroleum had opted for a strict
construction of Texas v. New Jersey, Texas could validly have escheated the
funds due to the twenty-five states which have the Uniform Act, since their
laws do not provide for escheat in this situation. The Texas statute could
have been limited by the rule of Texas v. New Jersey, and Texas could have
joined the Uniform states with truly reciprocal legislation. Instead, Texas has
chosen a singular path. That Republic Petroleum can withstand federal
scrutiny is doubtful. With the Uniform Act's solution shining as a bright star
in the horizon, that "ease of administration" sought by the Court seems
tangibly close.
V.

CONCLUSION

Substantial conflicts problems remain in the field of escheat of intangibles.
Solutions are possible through either truly uniform legislation or resolution on
a case-by-case basis by the United States Supreme Court. For the moment,
the Uniform Act offers an effective solution to at least the major problem of
jurisdiction over intangibles for purposes of escheat and is consistent with the
federal guidelines. 239 The jurisdictional solution adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in Republic Petroleum, however, ignores the trend of Supreme
Court decisions during the last two decades and is inconsistent at the threshold
with the controlling rule of Texas v. New Jersey.240 The Texas court should
have considered the current state of the law in other jurisdictions before
adopting the "only possible" solution.
234. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 471-A:15(IV) (1968).
235. UDUPA § 10; see text accompanying notes 100-02 supra.
236. UDUPA §§ 5, 10.
237. Id. § 10. The Act's reciprocity clause limits this jurisdictional benefit to other
states with similar legislation.
238. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3272a, § 10 (1968); see text accompanying
notes 137-38 supra.
239. An exception to this statement may exist with respect to the Uniform Act's
provisions regarding utility deposits. See note 100 supra.
240. Texas administrative escheat proceedings from Jan. 1970-Aug. 1975 brought
over $4 million into various state funds. Over 5,000 reports were filed under the administrative escheat statutes. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Scott Garrison
of Sept. 17, 1975. See text accompanying notes 115-117 supra.

